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In this text, Alasdair Cochrane argues for an animal rights 
theory intended to “decouple animal rights from animal libera-
tion” (19). By liberation, Cochrane is referring to the belief that 
it is wrong to exploit or own animals in any way. This viewpoint 
is often accredited to philosopher Tom Regan’s seminal 1983 
book, The Case for Animal Rights. Cochrane states that this 
belief is central to the animal rights movement and is in con-
trast to theories of what he and others call “animal welfarism”, 
which refers to an interest-based utilitarianism made famous 
by Peter Singer’s 1975 book, Animal Liberation. Singer, as op-
posed to Regan, does not necessitate the liberation of animals 
from ownership and exploitation, but emphasizes liberation 
from speciesism through equal consideration of the interests of 
all sentient beings. 
These two philosophies have existed for decades with little 
overlap. Cochrane, however, presents an alternative theory that 
argues that animals indeed do have rights, but the right to be 
liberated is not one of them. This is because he believes that, 
“the majority of sentient animals…lack the capacities of au-
tonomous agency” (11). By autonomous agency, Cochrane is 
referring to the capability and interest in framing and pursing 
long-term life goals. Therefore, he argues that animals are not 
necessarily harmed just by being owned or exploited and are 
unaware and lacking of any interest, and thus right, to be liber-
ated from ownership and exploitation. As follows, Cochrane 
contends that we have a moral obligation to end practices that 
result in the suffering and death of animals, but not to liberate 
them from ownership and exploitation. 
Cochrane’s interest-based rights theory is grounded in the ca-
pacity for well-being or the ability to lead a life that can go well 
or poorly. This is his criteria as to what makes a being sentient. 
Mark Suchyta
104
© Between the Species, 2015
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 18, Issue 1
He emphasizes that sentient beings have prima facie rights not 
to be harmed or killed. Similar to Singer’s preference-based 
utilitarianism, rare exceptions to this rule would arise when 
there is an interest to kill or harm an animal that carries more 
moral weight than that of the being’s interest not to be killed or 
harmed. For example, Cochrane reasons that it is not immoral 
for an Eskimo tribe to hunt a whale if the alternative is starving. 
However, in most modern societies, where human well-being 
can flourish without eating meat, it would not be permissible, 
as the whale’s interest in continued life and not experiencing 
pain in a hunt exceeds that of the human desire to eat it.
The philosophy that animals do not have a right not to be 
owned or exploited creates some interesting deviations from 
mainstream animal rights theory. For example, Cochrane main-
tains that it is not wrong to experiment on sentient begins if 
it does not harm or kill the animal. This is in sharp contrast 
to animal liberation theories. However, as he points out, ex-
periments that do not harm or kill are rare, thus calling for an 
overhaul of the current state of animal research. He also argues 
that it is not wrong to use animals in agriculture if it does not 
cause them harm or death. Therefore, a transition to veganism 
is not necessary as a limited amount of dairy and egg consump-
tion would still be permissible. This, however, is questionable, 
as the scale of these industries would have to be so drastically 
reduced that it’s hard to imagine in a world of over seven bil-
lion inhabitants. Nonetheless, Cochrane cleverly debunks the 
criticism that a transition to a more vegetarian or vegan diet 
would be devastating to those who make a living off of animal 
agriculture. He states:
There is often an economic cost to be paid for respecting the 
core interests of individuals, but that cost is rarely decisive in 
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deciding the moral issue. For example, there were economic 
costs in the abolition of slavery—particularly in the southern 
United States—but that did not render abolition the wrong 
course of action (85).
Cochrane is unafraid to address some of the stickiest animal 
rights dilemmas, such as invasive species and cultural and re-
ligious practices that use animals. In Chapter 7 (“Animals and 
the Environment”) he maintains that sentient overpopulated 
and invasive species, although sometimes problematic, still 
have an interest to live, forcing us to acknowledge their rights. 
Therefore, overpopulated and invasive species should be ad-
dressed by methods other than culling. He criticizes culling as a 
very short-term solution that needs to be continuously adopted, 
resulting in the infringement of the rights of numerous sentient 
beings year after year.  With the understanding that contracep-
tive programs have not been particularly effective to date, he 
advocates for further focus and investment on population con-
trol methods that are more effective and humane.
One concept that would have been interesting to see Co-
chrane develop further is sentience. He defines sentience as 
being able to experience and feel the world, therefore having 
a capacity for well-being. However, animal science has dem-
onstrated that this concept is not always so clear. For exam-
ple, some animals believed to be non-sentient have displayed 
primitive neurological responses that demonstrate an instinct to 
avoid harmful stimuli. Does this mean they can feel the world? 
Do they have a capacity for well-being? And furthermore, how 
will our definitions change as science continues to develop? 
Also, the assumption that most sentient beings do not have an 
interest in framing and pursing their own goals seems reason-
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able, but could also be a pitfall of our own speciesism. How 
would we really know?
Cochrane’s book is a concise read that addresses a wide 
range of ethical dilemmas in our current relationships with ani-
mals. It provides a broad overview of many of the fiercest de-
bates in the field and serves as a good introduction for someone 
new to the concept of animal rights while still being relevant 
to those better versed. It is a strong contribution to the animal 
rights discussion and challenges us to be open as to what the 
realization of animal rights means and should look like.
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